We find that substantial changes in board size, either an increase or a decrease of three or more directors at one time, are permanent movements rather than temporary changes, but the large changes are followed by small reversal in the subsequent years. Empirical evidence shows that all types of directors (inside, affiliated, and independent) are strongly affected by board size expansions (or reductions). Large changes in board size provide a good opportunity for a firm to optimize its board structure by increasing board independence and retiring elder directors. Further analysis indicates that such substantial changes in board size are associated with more frequent board meetings, a higher likelihood of CEO transitions, and firm size expansions. However, we find no evidence that large decreases (or increases) in board size add (or destroy) firm value for shareholders in the long run.
Introduction
The corporate scandals in the past years have generated considerable debates about boards of directors and corporate governance. A firm"s board of directors can help overcome agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control through hiring, monitoring, firing, and setting appropriate compensation for top management (Jensen, 1993) .The structure of a board of directors is, in part, determined by board independence and board size. 20 The findings from prior studies are mixed regarding the relation between firm value and board size. Some finance studies find evidence consistent with the agency theory that a small board is related to better firm performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gertner & Kaplan, 1996 ; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Denis & Sarin, 1999) . Under the consideration of coordination costs and free rider problems associated a large board, shareholders generally favor a smaller 20 A number papers have demonstrated the role of independent directors in protecting shareholders" wealth (e.g., Weisbach, 1988 board and, therefore, pressure companies to reduce board size (Gertner & Kaplan, 1996; Wu, 2000) . Some management studies, however, have found a large board to be better for a firm (e.g., Gales & Kesner, 1994; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999) , which is consistent with resource dependency theory. The theory posits that a large board can provide access to more resources than can a small board. Thus, the theory provides a positive relation between board size and firm performance (e.g., Boyed, 1990 ; Dalton et al., 1999) .
While the relation between board size and firm value has been examined extensively, few studies have explored the impact of large changes of board size on corporate governance and firm value. Yermack (1996) explores company stock return around the announcement dates of ten cases of large changes of board size and finds a positive abnormal return for five of six announcements of board-size reductions and negative returns for all four announcements of board-size expansions. The event study results support the notion that investors favor reductions in board size and react unfavorably to board expansions. But the paper analyzes only ten cases and does not examine the long-term effects of large board size changes on corporate governance systems and firm values. Denis and Sarin (1999) indicate that large changes in board structure result from the changes in business conditions and corporate restructurings. They define large changes in board size as either an increase or a decrease of at least three directors at one time. They present evidence that most publicly-traded companies show only minor changes in board size from year to year, but large changes in board size are not unusual for U.S. listed firms.
Our study employs a sample of randomlyselected CRSP-listed firms with large changes in board size over the period from 1988 to 1999 to examine the long-term stability of board size following the initial movements. We also explore the following research questions in the study: what factors have caused the substantial changes in board size? How do the large size changes affect a company"s board structure? How about the relationship between large changes of board size and firm value?
Consistent with Denis and Sarin (1999), we find significant evidence that large changes in board size are permanent rather than temporary changes. However, we find some evidence of a small reversal following large board size decreases and a significant reversal after large board size expansions, which is different from their findings.
Our study of the effect of large board size expansions or reductions on board structure, CEO characteristics, ownership structure, and firm characteristics provides strong evidence that all types of directors, including insiders, affiliated directors, and independent directors, are affected by substantial board size changes. Evidence shows that large board size changes, either increases or decreases, provide an excellent opportunity for a firm to optimize its board structure through increasing board independence and retiring the directors who are 62 or older. We also find that large changes in board size are closely related to a greater likelihood of CEO successions, the presence of a new CEO, and large increases in total assets.
Finally, we investigate short-term and long-term impact of large board size changes on firm value and firm performance. After examining nine years" Tobin"s Q values from three years before the large changes (Year -3) to five years after the changes (Year 5), we find no evidence that large decreases (or large increases) in board size add (or destroy) firm value. Further robustness tests using various financial performance ratios (e.g., return on assets, sales over assets, and return on sales) obtain a similar conclusion, suggesting that firms may be motivated by more than just firm-value maximization when selecting board size due to the trade-off between costs and benefits associated with small and large boards (Ning, Davidson, & Wang 2007) . Our paper differs from prior studies in several significant ways. First, we employ a large number of randomly-selected CRSP listed firms over a period from 1988 to 1999 to examine the stability of board size following large changes, and we find that large changes are permanent, but followed by small reversals in the subsequent years. Second, we examine the changes of board, CEO, ownership, and firm-specific variables around the large board size changes, which have not been explored in prior studies. Finally, we document the long-run impact of large board size change on the firm value measured by Tobin"s Q and firm performance measured by various financial ratios.
We structure the paper into five sections. In section 2, we review previous studies and develop testable hypotheses. In Section 3, we present data and sample selections. Then we conduct empirical analysis of board size changes on corporate governance variables and firm value in Section 4. The summary and conclusions are in Section 5.
Literature Review

The Stability of Board Size Following Large Changes
Large changes in board size and board structure are often caused by a firm"s large scale changes in ownership structure, CEO transitions, mergers and acquisitions, large scale restructurings of the firm"s assets, or fundamental changes in business conditions (Yermack, 1996; Denis & Sarin, 1999) ; therefore, these large board size changes are expected to be permanent rather than temporary. Denis and Sarin (1999) document that many firms exhibit large changes in board size and these large changes are permanent movements rather than temporary changes. But most firms show only small changes in board size from year to year. Because large changes in board size are caused by the company"s fundamental changes, our study will explore whether the large changes finally reverse during three years after the initial expansions or reductions and hypothesize: H 1 : Large changes, either large increases or large decreases, in board size are permanent movements rather than temporary changes.
The Causes of Large Changes in Board Size
Large changes in board size and board structure are often caused by a firm"s large scale changes in ownership structure, CEO transitions, mergers and acquisitions, large scale restructurings of the firm"s assets, or fundamental changes in business conditions (Yermack, 1996 
Large Changes in Board Size on Firm Value
Empirical findings are mixed regarding the relation between firm value and board size. While many finance studies provide evidence to support the agency theory that a small board is related to a higher firm value or better firm performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996 Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that large boards can be costly. . When board size increases, agency problems in the boardroom increase simultaneously, and lead to more director free-riding problems, more coordination and communication problems, and more internal conflicts among directors (Eisenberg et al., 1998 ). What"s more, a larger board is more likely to be controlled by the CEO and less likely for the board to control management, which leads to greater agency problems and costs. Empirical research has found consistent results supporting statistical inverse board size -firm value association. For example, Yermack (1996) employs a sample of large US publicly-traded firms from Forbes 500 and finds a consistent and inverse association between firm value measured by Tobin"s Q and the number of directors on the board. The inverse association holds even after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, market performance, business diversification, board composition, and ownership structure. Eisenberg et al. (1998) further test the board-size effects on a sample of 879 midsize and small Finnish firms. They confirm the findings of Yermack (1996) and find a consistent and negative correlation between board size and firm performance. However, Resource dependency theory suggests that companies are better off with large boards. Each new board member brings both expertise and access to resources. Having more board members would provide the firm with greater expertise and greater access to resources, including access to markets, new and better technologies, and more external contacts. On the other hand, large boards are more likely to have directors with greater diversity in education and industry experience. This diversity allows the board members to provide management with high-quality advice (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) .
The resource dependency theory is supported by a number of management studies (Pfeffer, 1973 
Data and Sample Selections
Our sample period is from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1999. 21 First, we identify all NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms that are listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data files at the beginning of 1988. There are 7,086 of these firms. Second, we randomly choose 2,000 firms from the list. To make sure that there is at least one year of board data for each firm, we first delete the 209 firms that disappear from CRSP during the first year of the analysis (1988) . From the remaining 1,791 firms, we proportionally select 26.5% of firms from each surviving-year category to construct the final sample. For example, in the 1,791 remaining firms, there are 164 firms that survive for only one or two years. We keep 26.5% of the 164 firms (43 firms) in our final sample. Similarly, there are 129 firms that survived for only two or three years, and we select the same proportion of the 129 firms (34 firms) for the final sample. We include these 34 firms for both years 1 and 2. We repeat the selection process for all other year categories. By keeping the surviving information 21 There were a number of corporate governance failures in 2000 and later years, followed by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley act expanded SEC authority and requires companies to have audit committees to be comprised of independent directors with a member having financial expertise among other provisions. The stock exchanges have also issued new rules in order to reduce the previous free-market determination of corporate governance system. Therefore, we restrict the sample in this study to a period ending December 31, 2999.
of the panel of firms in each year category during the sample period from 1988 to 1999, we avoid survivorship bias. We obtain a sample of 473 U.S. publicly traded firms in the first year. This number decreases each year; only 208 firms survived over the entire 12-years period (see Exhibit 1) . There are a total of 3,858 firm-years in the sample. We obtain approximately 3,550 firm-years" proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission from Lexis-Nexis and Q-files.
Following Denis and Sarin (1999), we define large changes in board size as either an increase or a decrease of at least three directors at one time. 22 With this selection procedure, we finally identify a total of 88 large changes in board size over the 12-year sample period from 1988 to 1999. Among these 88 large changes, 33 are large increases of at least three directors at one time, and 55 are large decreases of three or more members at one time. The frequency distribution of the sample is shown in Table 1 .
-----Insert Table 1 about Here -----
We obtained ownership, board of directors, and CEO data from the annual proxy statement. We categorize directors in the traditional manner as insiders, affiliated, and independent directors (Baysinger & Butler, 1985) . Insiders are currently employees of the firms. Affiliated directors are identified as those that have substantial business relations with the firm, are related to insiders, or are former employees. For those who are neither insiders nor affiliated directors, we label independent directors. Finally, we obtain financial data from the COMPUSTAT database.
Empirical Results
The Permanence of Large Changes in Board Size
We explore the permanence of large changes in board size by examining whether large changes in board size are persistent following the changes. We track these firms for three years after the initial movements to observe whether the large changes in board size finally reverse during the period. The mean and median values of board size from the year prior to large changes in board size (Year -1) through the third year following the year of large changes (Year +3) are given in Table 2 .
-----Insert Table 2 about Here ----- Figure 1 plots the mean and median values of board size over the five years from the Year -1 to Year +5.. 22 An alternative way to measure large changes in board is the percentage change in board size. We conduct robustness checks by defining large changes in board size as either an increase or decrease at least 25% of directors at one time, and we obtain quantitatively similar results.
-----Insert Figure 1 about Here -----
Both Table 2 and Figure 1 show that large changes in board size persist through year +3, supporting our expectation that large changes in board size are persistent movements rather than temporary changes. For the sample of firms with large expansions in board size, the mean differences are significantly positive between Year 0 and Year -1 (t = 9.59, significant at 0.001 level), Year +1 and Year -1 (t = 9.09, significant at 0.001 level), Year +2 and Year -1 (t = 5.61, significant at 0.001 level), as well as Year +3 and Year -1 (t = 4.58, significant at 0.001 level). We obtain similar findings for the firms with large board size reductions, the mean differences are significantly negative between Year 0 and Year -1 (t = -23.37, significant at 0.001 level), Year +1 and Year -1 (t = -11.54, significant at 0.001 level), Year +2 and Year -1 (t =-9.16, significant at 0.001 level), as well as Year +3 and Year -1 (t=-8.10, significant at 0.001 level). These findings strongly support the notion that large changes in corporate boards are permanent movements.
However, we also find evidence of a small reversal following large board size movements, especially for the firms with large expansions in board size, which is not consistent with Denis and Sarin (1999). They identified 129 large changes in board size from 1983 to1992, but didn"t find any median reversal following the large changes. We find that for firms with large increases in board size, the mean (median) value of board size was 10.82 (10) in Year -1 prior to the large changes. The board size dramatically increased to 15.03 (14) in Year 0, then partly reversed to 13.69 (12.5) in Year +1, 12.52 (12) in Year +2, and 12.89 (12) in Year +3. The t tests of mean board size reversal following the large board size expansions are significant at 0.01 or higher levels (t=-2.91, -4.73, -3.94, respectively). For firms with large decreases in board size, the mean (median) value of board size was 15.21 (15) in Year -1 prior to the large changes. The board size dramatically decreased to 11.61 (11) in Year 0, and 11.43 (10) in Year +1, then partly reversed to 12.31 (12) in Year +2, and 11.97 (12) in Year +3. The median number of directors for firms with either large increases or large reductions of board size in Year +2 and Year +3 is finally reversed to 12. But the t tests of mean board size reversal following large board size reductions are insignificant statistically.
Large Changes in Board Size on Board Structure and CEO Characteristics
To examine the influences of large board size changes on board structure and CEO characteristics, we compare the board and CEO variables before and after the large changes. The results are given in Table 3 .
-----Insert Table 3 about Here -----Panel A shows the impact of large board size movements on board structure. For the firms with large increases in board size, the average number of directors in all three categories increases significantly: inside directors (t=3.93, significant at 0.001 level); affiliated directors (t=1.78, significant at 0.1 level); and independent directors (t = 6.09, significant at 0.001 level). We find that only the proportion of independent directors increases from 67.03% in Year -1 to 68.73% after the change. The proportions of inside and affiliated directors on the board decrease, though the decreases are insignificant statistically (t=-1.04 and -0.28, respectively). We obtain similar results for the firms with large board size reductions. The average number of inside directors, affiliated directors, and independent directors decrease simultaneously and significantly (t= -4.26, -3.47, and -10.11, significant at 0.01 or higher levels). Although the number of independent directors decreases because of board size reductions, the proportion of independent directors on the board increases from 66.66% to 68.15% after large board size reductions. These findings suggest that when a firm expands or shrinks the size of its board, all types of directors will be affected, but board composition based on proportion criteria will not be affected significantly from a statistical perspective. On the other hand, large changes in board size, either expansions or reductions, offer the firm a good opportunity to make its board more independent, given the belief that independent directors are more likely to protect shareholder wealth and maximize firm value (Weisbach, 1988 The t test results in Table 3 also show that companies intend to use the chance of large board size changes to retire directors over 62 years old. The percent of directors 62 years old or older decreases substantially either on the boards with large expansions in size (t=-3.17, significant at 0.01 level), or on the boards with large reductions in size (t=-1.81, significant at 0.10 level). This finding together with the changes of board independence support the notion that large changes in board size is a good chance for a company to improve its board structure through increasing board independence and adding more younger board members. There is also some evidence that changed boards meet more frequently (t=1.90, significant at 0.10 level) and construct more board committees (t=1.72, significant at 0.10 level), indicating that boards are more active after large board size restructures.
Panel B in table 3 shows some interesting findings regarding CEO characteristics. First, we find significant evidence that large changes in board size are associated with a higher level of CEO successions (t=1.98, significant at 0.10 level). The presence of a new CEO whose tenure is less than 3 years is also substantially higher following large board size expansions (t=1.98, significant at 0.10 level) and reductions (t=2.18, significant at 0.10 level). Second, we find that the probability of a CEO holding the board chairman position (CEO duality) decreases when a board expands its size (t=-1.68, significant at 0.10 level), but increases when a board shrinks size (t =1.53). However, we find no significant changes in CEO age, CEO ownership, CEO being a founder, and CEO involved in director selections around large movements in board size.
Ownership and Firm Characteristics around Large Changes in Board Size
We further explore a firm"s ownership structure and firm-specific characteristics around the large expansions or reductions of board size, and show the results in Table 4 . Table 4 about Here -----We find that a firm with a higher inside ownership held by all directors and officers as a group (16.84%) is more likely to expand its board, and the board expansions further increase the inside ownership to 18.21% (t = 1.00, insignificant). On the other hand, a firm with a lower inside ownership (10.92%) is more likely to shrink its board, and the board size decreases further reduce the ownership to 10.02% (t = -1.71, significant at 0.10 level). Second, we find that a large movement in a firm"s board size is generally associated with the company"s large increases in total assets (t=2.24 and 1.14, respectively). However, we do not observe any significant changes in blockholdings, return on assets, market to book ratio, stock return, financial leverage (debt ratio), and capital expenditure (property, plant, and equipment to total assets) that can be closely related to the substantial board size changes.
-----Insert
Large Changes in Board Size on Firm Value
While a number of prior studies have documented an inverse board size -firm value association (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gertner & Kaplan, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Denis & Sarin, 1999), little research has been done regarding the short-run and long-run effects of large board size movements on firm value and firm performance. Our study intends to fill this gap. Following Yermack (1996) , we use Tobin"s Q 23 to measure firm value and report the mean and median values of Tobin"s Q three years prior to and five years following the large changes in board size (from Year -3 to Year +5) in Table 5 . 23 Tobin"s Q is calculated based on Chung and Pruitt (1994).We calculate Tobin"s Q as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. The book value of debt is the difference between the book value of assets and the book value of equity.
-----Insert Table 5 about Here -----
We further plot the mean and median values of board size over nine years around large board size changes in Figure 2 .
-----Insert Figure 2 about Here -----
Both the results in Table 5 and Figure 2 indicate that firm value does not improve substantially following large board structure changes. We employ Wilcoxon Sign test of Tobin"s Q values for five selected years, Year 0 vs. Year -3, Year 0 vs. Year -1, Year +1 vs. Year -1, Year +3 vs. Year -1, and Year +3 vs. Year -1, and find no significant evidence that firm value changes following large board expansions or reductions. The one-way ANOVA test of Tobin"s Q across all nine years from Year -3 to Year +5 provides further evidence that both large decreases and increases in board size impose an insignificant impact on the value of the firm.
Additionally, we follow Yermack (1996) to use three additional financial variables (return on assets, sales over assets, and return on sales) to measure firm performance to conduct a robustness test of the results. Similarly, no significant evidence has been found that these financial ratios are significantly improved following large board size movements. This may provide some evidence supporting Ning, Davidson, and Wang (2007), who argue that firms are motivated by more than just firm-value maximization when selecting board size given the trade-off of the likely costs and benefits associated with small and large boards. A firm tends to adjust its board size to the target board size zone which is influenced by various industry and firm characteristics.
Conclusions
Several studies have been done regarding the statistical inverse relation of firm value and the number of directors on the firm"s board (Yermack, 1996 2007) , but few studies investigate the impact of large changes in board size, defined as an increase or decrease at least three directors at one time, on the firm"s board composition, CEO characteristics, ownership structure, firm characteristics, and firm value. Our study intends to fill this void using a randomly-selected sample of 88 companies with large changes of board size from 1988 to 1999 to explore the issue.
First, we find strong evidence that large changes in board size are persistent movements rather than temporary changes, which is consistent with Denis and Sarin (1999) . However, we also find evidence of small reversals following large board size decreases and significant reversal after large increases in board size, which is different from their findings.
Second, we explore the changes of board structure, CEO, ownership, and firm characteristics around large board size changes, and find strong evidence that the number of directors of all types (inside, affiliated, and independent) moves in the same direction as the movements of board size. Large board size changes provide a good opportunity for a firm to improve its board structure through increasing board independence and make board members younger. Empirical evidence also shows that large changes in board size are associated with more board meetings and committees, a greater probability of CEO turnovers, the higher presence of a new CEO whose tenure is less than 3 years, and large increases in total assets. These findings provide further evidence supporting Yermack (1996) and Denis and Sarin (1999) . They argue that large changes in board size often result from a firm"s fundamental changes in business conditions, large changes in ownership structure, CEO transitions, or assets restructurings.
Finally, we delve into the issue of short-term and long-term effects of large changes of board size on firm value and firm performance. After examining nine years" Tobin"s Q values from Year -3 to Year 5, we conclude that both large decreases and large increases in board size do not seem to add (or destroy) firm value measured by Tobin"s Q. Further analysis of three financial ratios (return on assets, sales over assets, and return on sales) draw a similar conclusion. Firms may be motivated by more than just firm valuemaximization when selecting board size. They consider the trade-off of benefits and costs associated with large boards (Ning, Davidson, & Wang, 2007) . They have incentives to move their board size towards an optimal board size zone over time. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
